Nelson Mandela said, “And later when we felt that we now have quite a solid support among the masses, we then decided to select 6 laws which we felt were most oppressive. We would define these laws and deliberately go to jail and not pay fines in order to focus attention on the repressive policies of the (apartheid) government”.

Mandela and his colleagues intelligently and consciously engaged in strategic non-violent civil disobedience.

Here is a man, at the height of political repression of the blacks by the apartheid regime when everyone was pondering whether to weigh a fully-fledged war against the government; he stood strong and wise and opted for a non-violent civil disobedience strategy. This is the profound level of wisdom and temperance, which unfortunately has been misconstrued by some of our impatient political ‘pundits’ in Zimbabwe as being too lenient. This is a clear attempt to brainwash and keep everyone in check and under the authorities feet. These politicians know that if Zimbabwe becomes very politically conscious of what Mandela did, the same things that he did may be applied against their corruption and evil and torturous politicking. These are men who have seen how Mubarak was deserted by his own security people, doing what Henry David Thoreau suggested, “If the machine of government is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law”.

Mandela has brought this lesson to Africa that it is the duty of the people to give a moral check, in the most non-violent ways possible, to the actions of a government.

“One has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.”
Martin Luther King Jr.

I am currently developing a Ward 7 (Harare City Council – Strathaven, Avondale, Alex Park, Gun Hill) directory, so people who live here can also buy and play here. It’s about building community, getting to know your neighbours. I walk from shop to church to police station to school to sports club to next shop, and get the contact details for public consumption.

I am amazed at how many places, mainly shops, but even a hospital; do not want to give out information.

“What do you want to know for?”
“Why should we tell you?”
“We can’t give that information out”
“What will you do with it?”

Is this the legacy of thirty years of democracy? That Zimbabweans are so mistrustful that they will not tell the public what the phone number of their shop is? Do they believe ‘Big Brother’ is watching them with CCTVs, Internet devices, etc? Is there some conspiracy I am unknowingly a part of by gathering their (not even private) information?

Or do Zimbabweans simply mistrust their government (unity or otherwise), and have such fear of the ‘authorities’. Most public establishments have a posted on the sign board outside on the street – which is why I have gone in to talk to them – but they are afraid to let anyone take any details. Has the government grown so far away from the people … a favourite phrase from so many liberation speeches of the 50s and 60s, (from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address)? We want a “government, of the people, by the people, and for the people”. And what have we got? A government of elites, by elites, for elites; we have ‘Representatives’ that do not drive or walk the same streets, do not buy in the same shops, do not have children in the same schools, do not see the same doctors, as us.

Or do I look like a Nigerian spammer? Is it just me they don’t trust? Why is there such fear, belligerence, refusal, denial, and hostility, towards giving the community information that will make them find you, come into your shop, and buy something?

Protests in Turkey are getting a lot of press attention and social media coverage. With images like these showing inspiring acts of defiance and public courage, it is not hard to know why.

I found this article, about why Taksim is not Tahrir – but how “social media fuelled protests” still have a certain style, very useful. Amongst other things, Zeynep Tufekci writes, social media style protests share these eight characteristics:

• Lack of organized, institutional leadership
• A feeling of lack of institutional outlet
• Non-activist participation
• Breaking of pluralistic ignorance
• Organized around a “no” not a “go”
• External Attention
• Social Media as Structuring the Narrative
• Not Easily Steerable Towards Strategic Political Action

Tufekci points out that, in part because of these characteristics, social media style protests won’t topple governments by themselves. But they do provide important opportunities to signal dissent, and to show those who might be dissatisfied with certain elements of government that they are not alone.

Here is Simukai Tinhu, a political analyst based in London, writing on the Guardian:

Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe has announced that he will hold elections before the end of July – ostensibly respecting by a recent court ruling but in effect over-riding calls for political reforms before the vote takes place.

In the coalition government, Mugabe’s Zanu-PF has stalled reforms over the last four years by diverting attention towards the removal of western sanctions. It is now inconceivable that the changes necessary for a free and fair vote will be instituted in the next few weeks, and Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) will have to find another way to defeat Zanu-PF.

Here’s some suggestions:

1. Embrace populism

Buoyed by the ‘Africa rising’ narrative, nationalism is on the rise across the continent, and Zimbabwe is no exception. In recent elections in Zambia and Kenya, the victors – Michael Sata and Uhuru Kenyatta – ran sustained anti–western campaigns that drew the support of the young and educated.

If the opposition wants to succeed, they might as well embrace nationalism and adopt a position where they argue that they are the best guarantor of the independence legacy that has been betrayed by Zanu-PF. In other words, this time around Tsvangirai might need to wage a more populist, more aggressive campaign that might even be reminiscent of Mugabe’s tone (though moderated).

Tsvangirai should also attempt to convince some of Mugabe’s softer supporters that he can secure the gains of the current regime, such as land reform. This will put Zanu-PF in a defensive mode, and deprive them of ammunition to attack Tsvangirai as a neo–imperialist agent. The trouble with adopting such a strategy is that it needs time, and there is precious little of that if elections are indeed to be held by the 31 July.

2. Undermine Zanu-PF

Another pillar of the opposition efforts should be undermining Zanu-PF party unity. Currently, the aging president skilfully manages a brittle internal balance of power between various factions. But maintaining such a balance is extremely difficult and a great deal of it is done via patronage politics. Undermining elite cohesion by bringing key individuals into the fold of the opposition is likely to achieve two objectives. This tactic not only brings with it patronage networks, but also the former stalwart’s votes, and experience. Second, and at a psychological level, drawing party stalwarts counters the narrative that Zanu-PF’s unity is invincible.

3. Form a coalition of the opposition

One realistic campaign strategy remains: a coalition of opposition forces. The main opposition party (MDC-T) continues to be adamant that it will win on its own. Tsvangirai’s party seems oblivious to a mountain of complex of problems it faces; a dwindling support base, unequal level playing field, circumscribed regional and international support, a surge in Zanu-PF popularity and also a crowded opposition space with reportedly 28 eight candidates vying for the presidency. MDC-T needs to be realistic and understand that joining a coalition is crucial.

It is crucial that the MDC-T doesn’t try to go it along. The opposition has failed in the previous elections despite odds being slightly better than today. In fact, no single political party has successfully challenged Zanu-PF’s stranglehold on Zimbabwean politics since independence.

A coalition would not only change the fundamentals of Zimbabwean opposition, but also the very terms in which the Zimbabweans think about and define national politics. So the best way of topping Mugabe is for the opposition to combine its efforts, resources and votes.

4. Choose your partners carefully

The MDC-T, despite its faults in coalition government, remains the anchor of the opposition and should therefore take a lead in any negotiations. Building a strong coalition should be limited to the MDC-N (led by Welshman Ncube) to back Tsvangirai as the presidential candidate. Ncube is a polarising figure and is perceived as being vocal on behalf of the voters from Matabeleland and the Midlands regions. But it is precisely because of this quality that he is in a unique position to mobilise votes from these two regions.

Drawing Simba Makoni (Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn) and Dumiso Dabengwa (Zapu-PF) into an alliance might be problematic. Politically both men were creations of Zanu-PF and still benefit materially from ancient Zanu-PF patronage networks. It is not unreasonable that some see Dabengwa and Makoni’s political parties as proxies created by Zanu-PF to disrupt the strength of the opposition.

The differences between the MDC-T and MDC-N leaders are fundamental. Ncube accuses Tsvangirai of being weak on democratic and leadership credentials, while the Tsvangirai accuses Ncube of being provincial. Each sees himself as best suited to be president.

5. Be generous

To create an environment for constructive dialogue, relations between Tsvangirai and Ncube need to be reset. Tsvangirai must desist from making statements that risk pushing Ncube’s party further away. It is important to remember that Ncube is one of the architects and ideologues of the original MDC. Instead of ridiculing him, Tsvangirai should acknowledge his contribution and treat him as a friend who must be embraced. He also needs to acknowledge Ncube’s growing influence and support in the Matabeleland and Midland regions.

In extending an olive branch, MDC-T must attempt to address some of Ncube’s legitimate grievances. Ncube remains convinced that Tsvangirai and his inner circle worked to block his ascent to the top of the party. Ncube also alleges that MDC-T has deliberately undermined his party by labelling it as “tribal” or provincial.

Whilst the above are manageable problems, more difficult is the discussion of who is going to be offered what as part of the strategic partnership. The main MDC must be seen to be generous in what it offers. Ncube’s party will seek assurances on key positions in return for backing the coalition, as they cannot be expected to relinquish their independence without getting tangible offers in return. Equally, the MDC-N leader will need to display humility and self discipline.

Despite their differences, a coalition of the opposition is a possible and viable strategy. The two parties have a convergent interest of getting rid of Mugabe. We also have to remind ourselves that in the 2008 presidential elections Ncube urged his supporters to vote for Simba Makoni. Such an unprecedented overture shows his pragmatic side and that he is open to negotiations.

6. Don’t falter. Not forming a coalition is not an option

Failure to form a united opposition is a prescription for defeat. The MDC-T is trailing Zanu-PF in polls, and no one who is seriously concerned with political and electoral strategies can afford to ignore these, no matter how flawed or old they are. Not only do the polls show that Zanu-PF support has surged, but most importantly the party may use these numbers to justify a rigged electoral “win”. Poor shows at rallies, an unequal level playing field and circumscribed regional and international support also counts against the MDC-T.

Politics needs ideals and policies, but most crucially a sense of direction. Zanu-PF is corrupt, ruthless and violent, but nobody can accuse Mugabe’s party of being directionless. They alone seem to know how to get what they want in the next elections and they may well be rewarded for that. Their adversaries should be wise enough to draw together and substitute competition for political union. A coalition coupled with an effective campaign strategy offers the best chance.

Curious about the 31 July ruling and the implications for Zimbabwe’s elections?

Get to the SAPES Policy Dialogue Forum

Date: Tuesday 4 June 2013
Time: 5pm – 7pm
Venue: SAPES Seminar Room, 4 Deary Avenue, Belgravia, Harare
Topic: The Supreme Court Ruling on Elections: What are the implications?

Chair: Pettinah Gappa, Lawyer
Panellists: Lovemore Madhuku, President NCA
Douglas Mwonzora, MDC-T Spokesman
Welshman Ncube, President MDC-N

All Welcome

Cost: $10 for non-members
SAPES Seminar Club Membership Forms available at entrance

Feel free to visit our website at www.sapes.org.zw

I have to agree with Zimbabwe’s Deputy Chief Justice Malaba, who has said that the Constitutional Court’s ruling that elections in Zimbabwe must be held by 31 July “defied logic.”

As the Guardian points out, Malaba critiqued the ruling for contradictorily both censuring Mugabe for being in breach of his constitutional responsibilities “and at the same time authorising him to continue acting unlawfully” by proclaiming a July date.

And this is exactly the problem. Never mind larger issues like media reform, or the tricky question of redefining just what Zimbabweans are voting for in terms of proportional representation, a new addition with the new Constitution. As David Coltart helpfully spelt out to the Daily News, there are a number of basic steps that have to happen on the way to an election date. All of this means that Mugabe can’t, actually, declare today that an election will be held on or before 31 July – It’s too late for that. So how does Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Court set an arbitrary date by which an election must be held – knowing that this will force illegal actions – and thereby violating the rights not only of the disenfranchised voters who brought the legal petition in the first place, but all of Zimbabwe’s other voters?

We asked some of our subscribers whether elections before 31 July could be free and fair, and they were sceptical:

• These elections won’t be free and fair
• No to July 31 election. Not enough time for reforms
• It’s a plan from Zanu PF and its allies not to hold credible elections. It’s risky coz the issue of reforms aren’t ripe.

“Zimbabwe’s authorities cannot expect to create a rights-respecting environment ahead of elections in the context of repression, harassment, and intimidation of civil society activists,” Human Rights Watch’s Tiseke Kasambala said in March.

Personally, it’s hard not to feel like this is playing right into Mugabe’s hands. He gets to “declare” elections without critical reforms because not doing so would be in violation of “the independence of the judiciary.” Meanwhile, the fact that actually having the election before 31 July would, at this stage, require a violation of some of the steps which, legally, have to happen before an election? Well, when did this government ever let the law stop them from doing what they want?

In short, it’s just not possible to have legal elections by the 31st of July, never mind free and fair ones, or credible ones.  Oh yeah – When did that ever stop them either?