Land reform in Zimbabwe not a complete failure
I read with interest an article published on the Brookings Institution blog. The authors of the article, John Mutenyo and Brandon Routman pointed out the potential pitfalls of the proposed Nationalisation of the Zimbabwe Mining Sector by Minister Kasukwere. Land reform was used in the article as a case in point. The authors charged that:
Most of this land, particularly the parcels located in good farming areas, ended up in the hands of members of President Mugabe’s political party, the ZANU-PF, or in the hands of loyal army officials. Everyone else was given inferior farming land, if any at all.
The authors of the article made an excellent point in observing that nationalisation of the mining sector may be subject to corruption and therefore not benefit the masses, and proceeded to make some policy recommendations that I think if Minister Kasukwere is serious, he should at least consider.
However the premise upon which these conclusions are based is fallacious. As both authors are researchers with the respected and renowned Brookings Institution, it is regrettable that they neglected to use actual research done in Zimbabwe and instead cited a BBC news article on the subject of Land Reform in their blog.
Contrary to what is stated as fact in the article, Land Reform was not a failure. The empirical evidence of two studies conducted by two separate teams: one with the UK based Institute for Development Studies in the UK, and the other with the African Institute for Agrarian Studies, show that the supposed elites and cronies of Mugabe constitute less that 5% of the beneficiaries of Land reform. The IDS study reports that:
The composition of land reform beneficiaries is highly varied. The claim that land reform was dominated by politically well-connected “cronies” is simply untrue…the majority came from rural backgrounds where they had been farming in the communal areas…and farm workers too have been important beneficiaries.
In addition the reasons for the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy post 2000 cannot simply be ascribed to lower levels of agricultural productivity. In addition to bad economic policies there are other factors that contributed to the failure of the economy, which began well before the farm invasions occurred. For example, in the five years of ESAP reforms, unemployment reached 50%, no new jobs were created, numerous companies were shut down, and Zimbabwe’s debt increased to 100% under ESAP related borrowing which was encouraged by Zimbabwe’s then donor partners. After Land reform these partners were nowhere to be found. The article itself notes that ‘foreign direct investment declined from $435 million in 1998 to nil in 2001′.
Having said that, there is no denying the corruption, mismanagement and bad governance that has resulted in Zimbabwe’s present predicament. But, if we are to criticise Zimbabwe’s leaders or discuss her future, her economy and her policies then let us do so with the correct facts in hand.