The Herald today announced that ward-based mobile voter registration in Zimbabwe will begin on Monday, and end 9 July. The new Constitution requires a 30-day voter registration exercise before new elections, so this is an essential part of Zimbabwe toward elections. At the mobile centres, there will also be an opportunity for people to get IDs and birth certificates.

According to The Herald, The Registrar General has said four teams are to cover all wards in a given district. If this is the case, if a district has, say, 20 wards, a team would spend 6 days in that ward. But a district like Harare has 45 wards – that means only 2 ½ days per ward – which, if the previous mobile voter registration exercise is anything to go by, is nowhere near enough time.

The Zimbabwe Election Support Network’s report on the May mobile voter registration exercise recommended that for voter registration, ”adequate time must be allocated to each centre in proportion to the population density in the community.” It’s not clear how sending four teams to cover all wards in any given district accomplishes that.

As SW Radio Africa reports, however, the publicity around this exercise has yet to begin – and even basic information like where one should go for their ward, and on what days, has yet to be shared with the public.

Also worrying is the basic fact that, as David Coltart helpfully explains, if mobile voter registration ends on 9 July, elections cannot be legally held before 31 July. It works like this:

• According to the Electoral Act, you need at least 28 days between nomination court (when all the candidates get vetted and approved) and elections
• You can’t have nomination court before the voters roll for that election is finalised, because a) a candidate has to be on the voters roll and b) the people who nominate him/her have to be on the voters roll

Presumably it might also take a day or two to close up the voter registration exercise and get the voters roll out for each relevant ward and constituency for nomination court? But even if it doesn’t, 28 days from 10 July puts us at 7 August. So one way or the other, Zimbabwe’s elections will violate a court order, violate Zimbabwe’s Constitution, or violate the Electoral Act. Promising start. I’m no lawyer. But surely out of those three options, the court order is the one with the least sway? Personally, I think we should drop the ridiculous “elections by 31 July frenzy,” and rather look to hold legal, Constitutional and properly prepared for elections on a date that makes sense and follows the law.

I’ve just made some tea at the office. You know how it goes: open tap, fill kettle, boil kettle, pour water into teapot.

Except, with Harare water in crisis like it is across Zimbabwe, it usually isn’t that simple. Sometimes it’s open tap, find nothing coming out, close tap, grab jug. Sometimes it’s switch on pump, open tap, fill kettle, switch off pump. Incredibly, today, it’s open tap, fill kettle. I should have known it wouldn’t actually be that simple in reality.

But I’m standing there in the kitchen with the boiled kettle, and something does not smell right. If I’m honest, it smells like someone has left their poo in the rubbish bag by the window. But who wants to think that?! So I think maybe it’s the toilets at the service station over the road? Maybe it’s a rotting banana peel in the rubbish (I do loathe bananas)? It takes my colleague to point out: It’s the water.

I sniff, recoil, and sniff again. She’s right. The cup, the teapot, even the kettle now all smell like feces. Open the tap, fill another cup of water? A brown liquid in the glass, and an even stronger feces smell.

I suppose we should be grateful, right – Our office block most often doesn’t have tap water at all. But personally? I’d rather have nothing flowing from my taps than this sewage smell pervading everywhere.

The manager of our office block tells me it started around 10am – when City of Harare water finally came back to the taps. Apparently, the smell is a big infusion of chemicals, not the opposite, and it will just take a bit of time to work it’s way through the system. But since news reports suggests water chemicals in Harare are scarce,  it’s hard not to be suspicious. They’re working on it, he tells me – It was even worse earlier in the day. Again, this implicit: “You should be grateful.”

But I don’t want to feel grateful that my office smells like sewage. I want to be able to open the tap, make a decent cup of tea, wash up afterwards, and not feel nauseated in the process.

Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition Public Meeting

Topic: The Constitutional Court judgement, an era of new Constitution and the SADC special summit on Zimbabwe. What are the implications for holding a peaceful free and fair election in Zimbabwe?

Date: 5 June 2013
Time: 5:30pm – 8pm
Venue: Crowne Plaza Hotel, Harare

Speakers:

• Virginia Muwanigwa – Women’s Coalition
• Douglas Mwonzora – MDC-T
• Nhlanhla Dube – MDC N
• Paul Mangwana – Zanu PF
• Trust Maanda – Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR)
• Pedzisai Ruhanya – Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (ZDI)

Hosts:

• Oslie Matsikenyeri – Former Miss Zimbabwe
• Nixon Nyikadzino – Programs Manager, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition

Free – Anyone can attend. The police have been notified of this event.

Visit the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition fact sheet

Protests in Turkey are getting a lot of press attention and social media coverage. With images like these showing inspiring acts of defiance and public courage, it is not hard to know why.

I found this article, about why Taksim is not Tahrir – but how “social media fuelled protests” still have a certain style, very useful. Amongst other things, Zeynep Tufekci writes, social media style protests share these eight characteristics:

• Lack of organized, institutional leadership
• A feeling of lack of institutional outlet
• Non-activist participation
• Breaking of pluralistic ignorance
• Organized around a “no” not a “go”
• External Attention
• Social Media as Structuring the Narrative
• Not Easily Steerable Towards Strategic Political Action

Tufekci points out that, in part because of these characteristics, social media style protests won’t topple governments by themselves. But they do provide important opportunities to signal dissent, and to show those who might be dissatisfied with certain elements of government that they are not alone.

Here is Simukai Tinhu, a political analyst based in London, writing on the Guardian:

Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe has announced that he will hold elections before the end of July – ostensibly respecting by a recent court ruling but in effect over-riding calls for political reforms before the vote takes place.

In the coalition government, Mugabe’s Zanu-PF has stalled reforms over the last four years by diverting attention towards the removal of western sanctions. It is now inconceivable that the changes necessary for a free and fair vote will be instituted in the next few weeks, and Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) will have to find another way to defeat Zanu-PF.

Here’s some suggestions:

1. Embrace populism

Buoyed by the ‘Africa rising’ narrative, nationalism is on the rise across the continent, and Zimbabwe is no exception. In recent elections in Zambia and Kenya, the victors – Michael Sata and Uhuru Kenyatta – ran sustained anti–western campaigns that drew the support of the young and educated.

If the opposition wants to succeed, they might as well embrace nationalism and adopt a position where they argue that they are the best guarantor of the independence legacy that has been betrayed by Zanu-PF. In other words, this time around Tsvangirai might need to wage a more populist, more aggressive campaign that might even be reminiscent of Mugabe’s tone (though moderated).

Tsvangirai should also attempt to convince some of Mugabe’s softer supporters that he can secure the gains of the current regime, such as land reform. This will put Zanu-PF in a defensive mode, and deprive them of ammunition to attack Tsvangirai as a neo–imperialist agent. The trouble with adopting such a strategy is that it needs time, and there is precious little of that if elections are indeed to be held by the 31 July.

2. Undermine Zanu-PF

Another pillar of the opposition efforts should be undermining Zanu-PF party unity. Currently, the aging president skilfully manages a brittle internal balance of power between various factions. But maintaining such a balance is extremely difficult and a great deal of it is done via patronage politics. Undermining elite cohesion by bringing key individuals into the fold of the opposition is likely to achieve two objectives. This tactic not only brings with it patronage networks, but also the former stalwart’s votes, and experience. Second, and at a psychological level, drawing party stalwarts counters the narrative that Zanu-PF’s unity is invincible.

3. Form a coalition of the opposition

One realistic campaign strategy remains: a coalition of opposition forces. The main opposition party (MDC-T) continues to be adamant that it will win on its own. Tsvangirai’s party seems oblivious to a mountain of complex of problems it faces; a dwindling support base, unequal level playing field, circumscribed regional and international support, a surge in Zanu-PF popularity and also a crowded opposition space with reportedly 28 eight candidates vying for the presidency. MDC-T needs to be realistic and understand that joining a coalition is crucial.

It is crucial that the MDC-T doesn’t try to go it along. The opposition has failed in the previous elections despite odds being slightly better than today. In fact, no single political party has successfully challenged Zanu-PF’s stranglehold on Zimbabwean politics since independence.

A coalition would not only change the fundamentals of Zimbabwean opposition, but also the very terms in which the Zimbabweans think about and define national politics. So the best way of topping Mugabe is for the opposition to combine its efforts, resources and votes.

4. Choose your partners carefully

The MDC-T, despite its faults in coalition government, remains the anchor of the opposition and should therefore take a lead in any negotiations. Building a strong coalition should be limited to the MDC-N (led by Welshman Ncube) to back Tsvangirai as the presidential candidate. Ncube is a polarising figure and is perceived as being vocal on behalf of the voters from Matabeleland and the Midlands regions. But it is precisely because of this quality that he is in a unique position to mobilise votes from these two regions.

Drawing Simba Makoni (Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn) and Dumiso Dabengwa (Zapu-PF) into an alliance might be problematic. Politically both men were creations of Zanu-PF and still benefit materially from ancient Zanu-PF patronage networks. It is not unreasonable that some see Dabengwa and Makoni’s political parties as proxies created by Zanu-PF to disrupt the strength of the opposition.

The differences between the MDC-T and MDC-N leaders are fundamental. Ncube accuses Tsvangirai of being weak on democratic and leadership credentials, while the Tsvangirai accuses Ncube of being provincial. Each sees himself as best suited to be president.

5. Be generous

To create an environment for constructive dialogue, relations between Tsvangirai and Ncube need to be reset. Tsvangirai must desist from making statements that risk pushing Ncube’s party further away. It is important to remember that Ncube is one of the architects and ideologues of the original MDC. Instead of ridiculing him, Tsvangirai should acknowledge his contribution and treat him as a friend who must be embraced. He also needs to acknowledge Ncube’s growing influence and support in the Matabeleland and Midland regions.

In extending an olive branch, MDC-T must attempt to address some of Ncube’s legitimate grievances. Ncube remains convinced that Tsvangirai and his inner circle worked to block his ascent to the top of the party. Ncube also alleges that MDC-T has deliberately undermined his party by labelling it as “tribal” or provincial.

Whilst the above are manageable problems, more difficult is the discussion of who is going to be offered what as part of the strategic partnership. The main MDC must be seen to be generous in what it offers. Ncube’s party will seek assurances on key positions in return for backing the coalition, as they cannot be expected to relinquish their independence without getting tangible offers in return. Equally, the MDC-N leader will need to display humility and self discipline.

Despite their differences, a coalition of the opposition is a possible and viable strategy. The two parties have a convergent interest of getting rid of Mugabe. We also have to remind ourselves that in the 2008 presidential elections Ncube urged his supporters to vote for Simba Makoni. Such an unprecedented overture shows his pragmatic side and that he is open to negotiations.

6. Don’t falter. Not forming a coalition is not an option

Failure to form a united opposition is a prescription for defeat. The MDC-T is trailing Zanu-PF in polls, and no one who is seriously concerned with political and electoral strategies can afford to ignore these, no matter how flawed or old they are. Not only do the polls show that Zanu-PF support has surged, but most importantly the party may use these numbers to justify a rigged electoral “win”. Poor shows at rallies, an unequal level playing field and circumscribed regional and international support also counts against the MDC-T.

Politics needs ideals and policies, but most crucially a sense of direction. Zanu-PF is corrupt, ruthless and violent, but nobody can accuse Mugabe’s party of being directionless. They alone seem to know how to get what they want in the next elections and they may well be rewarded for that. Their adversaries should be wise enough to draw together and substitute competition for political union. A coalition coupled with an effective campaign strategy offers the best chance.